Abstract-Researchers have proposed formal definitions of quantitative information flow based on information theoretic notions such as the Shannon entropy, the min entropy, the guessing entropy, and channel capacity. This paper investigates the hardness and possibilities of precisely checking and inferring quantitative information flow according to such definitions.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider programs containing high security inputs and low security outputs. Informally, the quantitative information flow problem concerns the amount of information that an attacker can learn about the high security input by executing the program and observing the low security output. The problem is motivated by applications in information security. We refer to the classic by Denning [12] for an overview.
In essence, quantitative information flow measures how secure, or insecure, a program is. Thus, unlike noninterference [14] , that only tells whether a program is completely secure or not completely secure, a definition of quantitative information flow must be able to distinguish two programs that are both interferent but have different degrees of "secureness."
For example, consider the following two programs:
In both programs, H is a high security input and O is a low security output. Viewing H as a password, M 1 is a prototypical login program that checks if the guess g matches the password. 1 By executing M 1 , an attacker only learns whether H is equal to g, whereas she would be able to learn the entire content of H by executing M 2 . Hence, a reasonable definition of quantitative information flow should assign a higher quantity to M 2 than to M 1 , whereas noninterference would merely say that M 1 and M 2 are both interferent, assuming that there are more than one possible value of H.
Researchers have attempted to formalize the definition of quantitative information flow by appealing to information theory. This has resulted in definitions based on the Shannon entropy [12] , [7] , [19] , the min entropy [29] , the guessing entropy [16] , [1] , and channel capacity [22] , [20] , [26] . Much of the previous research has focused on information theoretic properties of the definitions and approximate (i.e., incomplete and/or unsound) algorithms for checking and inferring quantitative information flow according to such definitions.
In this paper, we give a verification theoretic and complexity theoretic analysis of quantitative information flow and investigate precise methods for checking quantitative information flow. In particular, we study the following comparison problem: Given two programs M 1 and M 2 , decide if X (M 1 ) ≤ X (M 2 ). Here X (M ) denotes the information flow quantity of the program M according to the quantitative information flow definition X where X is either SE [µ] (Shannon-entropy based with distribution µ), ME [µ] (minentropy based with distribution µ), GE [µ] (guessing-entropy based with distribution µ), or CC (channel-capacity based). Note that, obviously, the comparison problem is no harder than actually computing the quantitative information flow as we can compare the two numbers once we have computed X (M 1 ) and X (M 2 ).
Concretely, we show the following negative results, where X is CC , SE [µ], ME [µ], or GE [µ] with µ uniform.
property [30] , [9] for any k.
• Restricted to loop-free boolean programs, checking if
The results are in stark contrast to non-interference which is known to be a 2-safety property in general [3] , [11] (technically, for the termination-insensitive case 2 ) and can be shown to be coNP-complete for loop-free boolean programs (proved in Section III-C). (#P is known to be as hard as the entire polynomial hierarchy [31] .) The results suggest that precisely inferring (i.e., computing) quantitative information flow according to these definitions would be harder than checking non-interference and may require a very different approach (i.e., not self composition [3] , [11] , [30] ).
We also give the following positive results which show that checking if the quantitative information flow of one program is larger than the other for all distributions according to the entropy-based definitions is easier. Below, Y is SE , ME , or GE .
property.
These results are proven by showing that the prob-
We also show that this relation refines the channel-capacity based quantitative information flow, that is, if
is a 2-safety property implies that it can be reduced to a safety problem via self composition. This leads to a new approach to precisely checking quantitative information flow that leverages recent advances in automated software verification [2] , [15] , [24] , [4] . Briefly, given M 1 and M 2 , R(M 1 , M 2 ) means that M 1 is at least as secure as M 2 for all distributions while ¬R(M 1 , M 2 ) means that there must be a distribution in which M 1 is less secure than M 2 , according to the entropy-based definitions of quantitative information flow. Therefore, by deciding R(M 1 , M 2 ), we can measure the security of the program M 1 relative to another specification program M 2 . Note that this is useful even when M 1 and M 2 are "incomparable" by R, that is, when ¬R(M 1 , M 2 ) and ¬R(M 2 , M 1 ). See Section IV-B for the details.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the existing information-theoretic definitions of quantitative information flow. Section III proves the hardness of their comparison problems and thus shows the hardness of precisely inferring quantitative information flow according to these definitions. Section IV introduces the relation R 2 We restrict to terminating programs in this paper. (The termination assumption is nonrestrictive because we assume safety verification as a blackbox routine.) and proves it equivalent to the comparison problems for the entropy-based definitions with their distributions universally quantified. The section also shows that this is a 2-safety property and is easier to decide than the nonuniversally-quantified comparison problems, and suggests a self-composition based method for precisely checking quantitative information flow. Section V discusses related work, and Section VI concludes. Appendix A contains the supporting lemmas and definitions for the proofs appearing in the main text. The omitted proofs appear in the extended report [34] .
II. PRELIMINARIES
We introduce the information theoretic definitions of quantitative information flow that have been proposed in literature. First, we review the notion of the Shannon entropy [28] , H[µ](X), which is the average of the information content, and intuitively, denotes the uncertainty of the random variable X.
Definition 2.1 (Shannon Entropy): Let X be a random variable with sample space X and µ be a probability distribution associated with X (we write µ explicitly for clarity). The Shannon entropy of X is defined as
(The logarithm is in base 2.) Next, we define conditional entropy. Informally, the conditional entropy of X given Y denotes the uncertainty of X after knowing Y . Definition 2.2 (Conditional Entropy): Let X and Y be random variables with sample spaces X and Y, respectively, and µ be a probability distribution associated with X and Y . Then, the conditional entropy of X given Y , written
Next, we define (conditional) mutual information. Intuitively, the conditional mutual information of X and Y given Z represents the mutual dependence of X and Y after knowing Z. Definition 2.3 (Mutual Information): Let X, Y and Z be random variables and µ be an associated probability distribution.
3 Then, the conditional mutual information of X and Y given Z is defined as
Let M be a program that takes a high security input H and a low security input L, and gives the low security output O. For simplicity, we restrict to programs with just one variable of each kind, but it is trivial to extend the formalism to multiple variables (e.g., by letting the variables range over tuples). Also, for the purpose of the paper, unobservable (i.e., high security) outputs are irrelevant, and so we assume that the only program output is the low security output. Let µ be a probability distribution over the values of H and L. Then, the semantics of M can be defined by the following probability equation. (We restrict to terminating deterministic programs in this paper.)
Note that we write M (h, ) to denote the low security output of the program M given inputs h and . Now, we are ready to introduce the Shannon-entropy based definition of quantitative information flow (QIF) [12] , [7] , [19] .
Definition 2.4 (Shannon-Entropy-based QIF): Let M be a program with a high security input H, a low security input L, and a low security output O. Let µ be a distribution over H and L. Then, the Shannon-entropy-based quantitative information flow is defined
Intuitively, H[µ](H|L) denotes the initial uncertainty knowing the low security input and H[µ](H|O, L) denotes the remaining uncertainty after knowing the low security output.
As an example, consider the programs M 1 and M 2 from Section I. For concreteness, assume that g is the value 01 and H ranges over the space {00, 01, 10, 11}. Let U be the uniform distribution over {00, 01, 10, 11}, that is, U (h) = 1/4 for all h ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}. The results are as follows.
Consequently, we have that
. That is, M 1 is more secure than M 2 (according to the Shannon-entropy based definition with uniformly distributed inputs), which agrees with our intuition. Let us recall the notion of non-interference [10] , [14] . Definition 2.5 (Non-intereference): A program M is said to be non-interferent iff for any h, h ∈ H and ∈ L,
It is worth noting that non-interference can be formalized as a special case of the Shannon-entropy based quantitative information flow where the flow quantity is zero. Theorem 2.6: Let M be a program that takes highsecurity input H, low-security input L, and returns lowsecurity output O. Then, M is non-interferent if and only if ∀µ.SE [µ](M ) = 0. The above theorem is complementary to the one proven by Clark et al. [5] which states that for any µ such that
Next, we introduce the min entropy, which Smith [29] recently suggested as an alternative measure for quantitative information flow.
Definition 2.7 (Min Entropy): Let X and Y be random variables, and µ be an associated probability distribution. Then, the min entropy of X is defined
and the conditional min entropy of X given Y is defined
represents the highest probability that an attacker guesses X in a single try. We now define the minentropy-based definition of quantitative information flow.
Definition 2.8 (Min-Entropy-based QIF): Let M be a program with a high security input H, a low security input L, and a low security output O. Let µ be a distribution over H and L. Then, the min-entropy-based quantitative information flow is defined
Whereas Smith [29] focused on programs lacking low security inputs, we extend the definition to programs with low security inputs in the definition above. It is easy to see that our definition coincides with Smith's for programs without low security inputs. Also, the extension is arguably natural in the sense that we simply take the conditional entropy with respect to the distribution over the low security inputs.
Computing the min-entropy based quantitative information flow for our running example programs M 1 and M 2 from Section I with the uniform distribution, we obtain,
, and so M 2 is deemed less secure than M 1 .
The third definition of quantitative information flow treated in this paper is the one based on the guessing entropy [21] , that is also recently proposed in literature [16] , [1] .
Definition 2.9 (Guessing Entropy): Let X and Y be random variables, and µ be an associated probability distribution. Then, the guessing entropy of X is defined
The conditional guessing entropy of X given Y is defined
where
represents the average number of times required for the attacker to guess the value of X. We now define the guessing-entropy-based quantitative information flow.
Definition 2.10 (Guessing-Entropy-based QIF): Let M be a program with a high security input H, a low security input L, and a low security output O. Let µ be a distribution over H and L. Then, the guessing-entropybased quantitative information flow is defined
Like with the min-entropy-based definition, the previous research on guessing-entropy-based quantitative information flow only considered programs without low security inputs [16] , [1] . But, it is easy to see that our definition with low security inputs coincides with the previous definitions for programs without low security inputs. Also, as with the extension for the min-entropy-based definition, it simply takes the conditional entropy over the low security inputs.
We test GE on the running example from Section I by calculating the quantities for the programs M 1 and M 2 with the uniform distribution.
= 0.75
, and so M 2 is considered less secure than M 1 , even with the guessing-entropy based definition with the uniform distribution.
The fourth and the final existing definition of quantitative information flow that we introduce in this paper is the one based on channel capacity [22] , [20] , [26] , which is simply defined to be the maximum of the Shannon-entropy based quantitative information flow over the distribution.
Definition 2.11 (Channel-Capacity-based QIF): Let M be a program with a high security input H, a low security input L, and a low security output O. Then, the channel-capacity-based quantitative information flow is defined
Unlike the Shannon-entropy based, the min-entropy based, and the guessing-entropy based definitions, the channel-capacity based definition of quantitative information flow is not parameterized by a distribution over the inputs. As with the other definitions, let us test the definition on the running example from Section I by calculating the quantities for the programs M 1 and M 2 :
As with the entropy-based definitions (with the uniform distribution), we have that
, that is, the channel-capacity based quantitative information flow also says that M 2 is less secure than M 1 . Likewise, we study the hardness of the comparison problem C ME [µ], defined to be the problem
III. HARDNESS OF COMPARISON PROBLEMS
, and C CC , defined to be the problem CC (M 1 ) ≤ CC (M 2 ). As with C SE [µ], we require the two programs to share the same input domain for these problems.
We show that none of these comparison problems are ksafety problems for any k. Informally, a program property is said to be a k-safety property [30] , [9] if it can be refuted by observing k number of (finite) execution traces. A k-safety problem is the problem of checking a k-safety property. Note that the standard safety property is a 1-safety property. An important property of a k-safety problem is that it can be reduced to a standard safety (i.e., 1-safety) problem, such as the unreachability problem, via a simple program transformation called self composition [3] , [11] .
It is well-known that non-interference is a 2-safety property, 4 and this has enabled its precise checking via a reduction to a safety problem via self composition and piggybacking on advances in automated safety verification methods [30] , [25] , [32] . Unfortunately, the results in this section imply that quantitative information flow inference problem is unlikely to receive the same benefits.
Because we are concerned with properties about pairs of programs (i.e., comparison problems), we extend the notion of k-safety to properties refutable by observing k traces from each of the two programs. More formally, we say that the comparison problem C is a k-safety property if
] denotes the semantics (i.e., traces) of M , represented by the set of input/output pairs
We now state the main results of the section. (Recall that U denotes the uniform distribution.) We sketch the main idea of the proofs. All proofs are by contradiction. Let C be the comparison problem in the statement and suppose C is k-safety.
] satisfying the properties (1), (2) , and (3) above. From this, we constructM 1 andM 2 such that
is not a k-safety property for any
is not a k-safety property for any k > 0.
Theorem 3.3:
is not a k-safety property for any k > 0. 4 It is also well known that it is not a 1-safety property [23] .
Theorem 3.4: C CC is not a k-safety property for any k > 0.
A. Bounding the Domains
The notion of k-safety property, like the notion of safety property from where it extends, is defined over all programs regardless of their size. (For example, non-interference is a 2-safety property for all programs and unreachability is a safety property for all programs.) But, it is easy to show that the comparison problems would become "k-safety" properties if we constrained and bounded the input domains because then the size of the semantics (i.e., the input/output pairs) of such programs would be bounded by |H|×|L|. In this case, the problems are at most |H|×|L|-safety. 5 However, these bounds are high for all but very small domains, and are unlikely to lead to a practical verification method.
B. Proof of Theorem 3.1
We discuss the details of the proof of Theorem 3.1. The proofs of Theorems 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 appear in the extended report [34] .
For contradiction, suppose C SE [U ] is a k-safety property. Let M and M be programs having the same input domain such that (M, M ) ∈ C SE [U ]. Then, it must be the case that there exist
Let
where i, j ≤ k. Now, we construct new programsM and M as follows.
. . , h n }, and • n = 2k. Then, comparing the Shannon-entropy-based quantitative information flow ofM andM , we have,
(Note the abbreviations from Appendix A.) By lemma A.5, we have
Trivially, we have
As a result, we have
Note thatM andM have the same counterexamples T and
. This leads to a contradiction.
C. Complexities for Loop-free Boolean Programs
The purpose of this section is to show a complexity theoretic gap between non-interference and quantitative information flow. The results strengthen the hypothesis that quantitative information flow is quite hard to compute precisely, and also suggest an interesting connection to counting problems.
We focus on loop-free boolean programs whose syntax is given in Figure 1 . We assume the usual derived formulas φ ⇒ ψ, φ = ψ, φ ∨ ψ, and false. We give the usual weakest precondition semantics in Figure 2 .
To adapt the information flow framework to boolean programs, we make each information flow variable H, L, and O range over functions mapping boolean variables of its kind to boolean values. So, for example, if x and y are low security boolean variables and z is a high security boolean variable, then L ranges over the functions {x, y} → {false, true}, and H and O range over {z} → {false, true}.
6 (Every boolean variable is either a low security boolean variable or a high security boolean variable.) We write M (h, ) = o for an input (h, ) and an output o if (h, ) |= wp(M, φ) for a boolean formula φ such that o |= φ and o |= φ for all output o = o. Here, |= is the usual logical satisfaction relation, using h, , o, etc. to look up the values of the boolean variables. (Note that this incurs two levels of lookup.)
As an example, consider the following program.
M ≡ z := x; w := y; if x ∧ y then z := ¬z else w := ¬w Let x, y be high security variables and z, w be low security variables. Then,
We prove the following hardness results. These results are proven by a reduction from #SAT, which is the problem of counting the number of solutions to a quantifierfree boolean formula. #SAT is known to be #P-complete. Because #SAT is a function problem and the comparison problems are decision problems, a step in the proofs makes binary search queries to the comparison problem oracle a polynomial number of times. 
, and C CC are restricted to loop-free boolean programs. In summary, each comparison problem
, and C CC can be used a polynomial number of times to solve a #P-complete problem. Because Toda's theorem [31] implies that the entire polynomial hierarchy can be solved by using a #P-complete oracle a polynomial number of times, our results show that the comparison problems for quantitative information flow can also be used a polynomial number of times to solve the entire polynomial hierarchy, for the case of loop-free boolean programs.
As shown below, this presents a gap from noninterference, which is only coNP-complete for loop-free boolean programs. Theorem 3.9: Checking non-interference is coNPcomplete for loop-free boolean programs.
The above is an instance of the general observation that, by solving quantitative information flow problems, one is able to solve the class of problems known as counting problems, 7 which coincides with #SAT for the case of loopfree boolean programs.
D. Proof of Theorem 3.5
We discuss the details of the proof of Theorem 3.5. The proofs of Theorems 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 appear in the extended report [34] .
First, we prove the following lemma which states that we can compare the number of solutions to boolean formulas by computing SE [U ]. (For convenience, we use large letters H, L, O, etc. to range over boolean variables as well as generic random variables.) Lemma 3.10: Let − → H and H be distinct boolean random variables. Let i and j be any non-negative integers such that i ≤ 2
Formally, a counting problem is the problem of counting the number of solutions to a decision problem. For instance, #P is the class of counting problems associated with NP.
Then, from
The last line follows from
• If We prove the contraposition. Suppose j > i. Then,
The last line follows from the fact that 0
Then, using Lemma 3.10, we prove the following lemma which is crucial to proving Theorem 3.5.
Lemma 3.11: Let − → H be distinct variables and φ be a boolean formula over − → H . Then, the number of assignments for φ can be computed by executing an oracle that decides whether programs are in
Proof: First, we define a procedure that returns the number of solutions of φ.
Let F (j) ≡ O := ψ ∧ H where ψ is a formula over − → H having j assignments and H be a boolean variable such that H ∈ { − → H }. Note that, by Lemma A.4, such ψ can be generated in linear time.
Then, we invoke the following procedure where
then { = n; n = ( + r)/2; } else {r = n; n = ( + r)/2; } return n Note that when the procedure terminates, we have
, and so by Lemma 3.10, n is the number of satisfying assignments to φ.
We show that the procedure iterates at most | − → H |+1 times. To see this, every iteration in the procedure narrows the range between r and by one half. Because r − is bounded by 2 | − → H | , it follows that the procedure iterates at most | − → H |+1 times. Hence, the oracle C SE [U ] is accessed 3×(| − → H |+1)+2 times, and this proves the lemma.
Finally, Theorem 3.5 follows from Lemma 3.11 and the fact that #SAT, the problem of counting the number of solutions to a boolean formula, is #P-complete.
IV. UNIVERSALLY QUANTIFYING DISTRIBUTIONS
As proved in Section III, precisely computing quantitative information flow is quite difficult. Indeed, we have shown that even just comparing two programs on which has the larger flow is difficult (i.e., C SE , C ME , C GE , and C CC ).
In this section, we show that universally quantifying the Shannon-entropy based comparison problem C SE [µ], the min-entropy based problem C ME [µ], or the guessingentropy based problem C GE [µ] over the distribution µ is equivalent to a simple relation R enjoying the following properties.
(1) R is a 2-safety property.
(2) R is coNP-complete for loop-free boolean programs. Note that (1) implies that we can actually check if
for all µ via self composition (and likewise for C ME [µ] and C GE [µ]). We actually show in Section IV-B that we can even use the security-type-based approach suggested by Terauchi and Aiken [30] to minimize code duplication during self composition (i.e., do interleaved self composition).
We remind that except for the coNP-completeness result (Theorem 4.8), the results in this section apply to any (deterministic and terminating) programs and not just to loop-free boolean programs.
Definition 4.1: We define R to be the relation such that
Note that R(M 1 , M 2 ) essentially says that if an attacker can distinguish a pair of high security inputs by executing M 1 , then she could do the same by executing M 2 . Hence, R naturally expresses that M 1 is at least as secure as M 2 . 8 It may be somewhat surprising that this simple relation is actually equivalent to the rather complex entropy-based quantitative information flow definitions when they are cast as comparison problems and the distributions are universally quantified, as stated in the following theorems. First, we show that R coincides exactly with C SE with its distribution universally quantified.
The proof is detailed in Section IV-A. The next two theorems show that R also coincides with C ME and C GE with their distribution universally quantified. Theorem 4.3:
} The first half of the ⊆ direction of the proofs of the theorems above is much like the that of Theorem 4.2, that is, it makes the observation that M 2 disambiguates the high security inputs at least as fine as does M 1 . Then, the proof concludes by utilizing the particular mathematical properties relevant to the respective definitions. The proof for the ⊇ direction is also similar to the argument used in Theorem 4.2. The details of the proofs appear in the extended report [34] .
Next, we show that R refines C CC in the sense that if M 2 ) . This follows immediately from Theorem 4.2 and the definition of the channel-capacity based quantitative information flow.
Theorem 4.5: R ⊆ C CC Note that, the other direction, R ⊇ C CC , does not hold as R is not always a total order, whereas C CC is. It is also immediate from Theorem 4.2 and the property of noninterference (Theorem 2.6) that R is compatible with the notion of non-interference in the following sense.
Theorem 4.6: Let M 2 be a non-interferent program. Then, R(M 1 , M 2 ) iff M 1 is also non-interferent and M 1 has the same input domain as M 2 .
Next, we show that R is easier to decide than the nonuniversally-quantified versions of the comparison problems. First, it is trivial to see from Definition 4.1 that R is a 2-safety property.
Theorem 4.7: R is a 2-safety property. It can be shown that, restricted to loop-free boolean programs, R is coNP-complete. This follows directly from the observation that we can decide R by self composition thanks to its 2-safety property and the fact that, for loop-free boolean programs, self composition reduces the problem to an UNSAT instance. 9 Theorem 4.8: Restricted to loop-free boolean programs, R is coNP-complete.
A. Proof of Theorem 4.2
We discuss the details of the proof of Theorem 4.2. The proofs of Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 appear in the extended report [34] .
First, we prove the following lemma which says that,
Let O be the set of the outputs of M , and O be the set of the outputs of M . Then, for any , we have o∈O µ(o, ) log 
Now
and it leads to a contradiction. Hence, we have
We now prove Theorem 4.2.
Proof:
and
By Lemma 4.9 and the fact that (M, M ) ∈ R, we obtain for any
Then, we have
B. Quantitative Information Flow via Self Composition Theorems 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.7 imply that we can check if the entropy-based quantitative information flow of a program (i.e., SE, ME, and GE) is bounded by that of another for all distributions via self composition [3] , [11] . This suggests a novel approach to precisely checking quantitative information flow.
That is, given a target program M 1 , the user would construct a specification program M 2 with the same input domain as M 1 having the desired level of security. Then, she would check R(M 1 , M 2 ) via self composition. If so, then M 1 is guaranteed to be at least as secure as M 2 according to the Shannon-entropy based, the min-entropy based, and the guessing-entropy based definition of quantitative information flow for all distributions (and also channel-capacity based definition), and otherwise, there must be a distribution in which M 1 is less secure than M 2 according to the entropybased definitions.
Note that deciding R(M 1 , M 2 ) is useful even when M 1 and M 2 are R-incomparable, that is, when neither
. This is because ¬R(M 1 , M 2 ) implies that M 1 is less secure than M 2 on some distribution.
For example, suppose M 1 is some complex login program with the high security input H and the low security input L. And we would like to verify that M 1 is at least as secure as the prototypical login program M 2 below.
Then, using this framework, it suffices to just query if R(M 1 , M 2 ) is true. (Note that the output domains of M 1 and M 2 need not to match.)
We now describe how to actually check R(M 1 , M 2 ) via self composition. From M 1 and M 2 , we construct the selfcomposed program M shown below.
Note that R(M 1 , M 2 ) is true iff M does not cause an assertion failure. The latter can be checked via a software safety verifier such as SLAM and BLAST [2] , [15] , [24] , [4] .
As an aside, we note that this kind of construction could be easily generalized to reduce any k-safety problem (cf. Section III) to a safety problem, as shown by Clarkson and Schneider [9] . Note that the line L1 (resp. L2) of the pseudo code above is M 1 (resp. M 2 ) sequentially composed with a copy of itself, which is from where the name "self composition" comes. Therefore, technically, M is a composition of two self compositions.
L1 (and L2) are actually exactly the original self composition proposed for non-interference [3] , [11] . Terauchi and Aiken [30] noted that only the parts of M 1 (and M 2 ) that depend on the high security inputs H and H need to be duplicated and self composed, with the rest of the program left intact and "interleaved" with the self-composed parts. The resulting program tends to be verified easier than the naive self composition by modern software safety verifiers.
They proposed a set of transformation rules that translates a WHILE program annotated with security types [33] (or dependency analysis results) to an interleaved self-composed program. This was subsequently improved by a number of researchers to support a richer set of language features and transformation patterns [32] , [25] . These transformation methods can be used in place of the naive self compositions at L1 and L2 in building M . That is, we apply a security type inference (or a dependency analysis) to M 1 and M 2 to infer program parts that depend on the high security inputs H and H so as to only duplicate and self compose those parts of M 1 and M 2 .
C. Example
We recall the ideal login program below.
We check the four programs shown in Figure 3 using the above as the specification.
Here, H and L are 64-bit values, & is the bit-wise and operator, and << is the left shift operator. M 1 leaks the entire password. M 2 checks the password against the user guess but then leaks the first bit when the check fails. M 3 only checks the first 32 bits of the password. And, M 4 implements password checking correctly via a while loop.
We verify that only M 4 satisfies the specification, that is, R(M 4 , M spec ). To see that ¬R(M 1 , M spec ), note that for any , h, h such that h = , h = and h = h , we have that
To see that ¬R(M 2 , M spec ), note that for , h, h such that h = , h = , h&1 = 1 and h &1 = 0, we have M spec ) , let , h, h be such that h| 32 = | 32 , h | 32 = | 32 , and h = , 
10 (Here, x| 32 denotes x mod 2 32 , i.e., the first 32 bits of x.)
The results imply that for M 1 , M 2 , and M 3 , there must be a distribution where the program is less secure than M spec according to each of the entropy-based definition of quantitative information flow. For instance, for the Shannon-entropy based definition, we have for the uniform distribution U , That is,
Finally, we have that R(M 4 , M spec ), and so M 4 is at least as secure as M spec according to all of the definitions of quantitative information flow considered in this paper. In fact, it can be also shown that R(M spec , M 4 ). (However, note that M 4 and M spec are not semantically equivalent, i.e., their outputs are reversed.)
V. RELATED WORK
This work builds on previous work that proposed information theoretic notions of quantitative information flow [12] , [7] , [19] , [29] , [16] , [1] , [22] , [20] , [26] . The previous research has mostly focused on information theoretic properties of the definitions and proposed approximate (i.e., incomplete and/or unsound) methods for checking and inferring them. In contrast, this paper investigates the verification theoretic and complexity theoretic hardness of precisely inferring quantitative information flow according to the definitions and also proposes a precise method for checking quantitative information flow. Our method checks the quantitative information flow of a program against that of a specification program having the desired level of security via self composition for all distributions according to the entropy-based definitions.
It is quite interesting that the relation R unifies the different proposals for the definition of quantitative information flow when they are cast as comparison problems and their distributions are universally quantified. As remarked in Section IV, R naturally expresses the fact that one program is more secure than the other, and it could be argued that it is the essence of quantitative information flow.
Researchers have also proposed definitions of quantitative information flow that are not detailed in the main body of the paper. These includes the definition based on the notion of belief [8] , and the ones that take the maximum over the low security inputs [19] , [16] . It can be shown that R refines the comparison problems for these notions in the same sense as in Theorem 4.5 (for the belief-based definition, we universally quantify over the beliefs and the experiments). In fact, it can be shown that, for the beliefbased definition, the equivalence result holds much like those for the entropy-based definitions. 11 Despite the staggering complexity made apparent in this paper, recent attempts have been made to (more) precisely infer quantitative information flow (without universally quantifying over the distribution as in our approach). These methods are based on the idea of counting. As remarked in Section III-C, quantitative information flow is closely related to counting problems, and several attempts have been made to reduce quantitative information flow problems to them.
unlike our method, they use self composition repeatedly to find a new solution (i.e., more than a bounded number of times), and so their results do not contradict the negative results of this paper.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have investigated the hardness and possibilities of precisely checking and inferring quantitative information flow according to the various definitions proposed in literature. Specifically, we have considered the definitions based on the Shannon entropy, the min entropy, the guessing entropy, and channel capacity.
We have shown that comparing two programs on which has the larger flow according to these definitions is not a k-safety problem for any k, and therefore that it is not possible to reduce the problem to a safety problem via self composition. The result is in contrast to noninterference which is a 2-safety problem. We have also shown a complexity theoretic gap with non-interference by proving the #P-hardness of the comparison problems and coNP-completeness of non-interference, when restricted to loop-free boolean programs.
We have also shown a positive result that checking if the entropy-based quantitative information flow of one program is larger than that of another for all distributions is a 2-safety problem, and that it is also coNP-complete when restricted to loop-free boolean programs.
We have done this by proving a surprising result that universally quantifying the distribution in the comparison problem for the entropy-based definitions is equivalent to a simple 2-safety relation. Motivated by the result, we have proposed a novel approach to precisely checking quantitative information flow that reduces the problem to a safety problem via self composition. Our method checks the quantitative information flow of a program for all distributions against that of a specification program having the desired level of security.
